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 “PEACE AND SECURITY” AS COUNTERTERRORISM?  
THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF LIBERAL INTERVENTIONS IN KENYA 




This article analyses the merging of development and security in Western policies vis-à-vis 
“deficient” states in the global south, looking at the social life of anti-terror policies in Kenya. The 
attacks on September 11, 2001 renewed the interest in strong and stable states, leading many 
donors to focus on capacity building and security sector reform. In Kenya, the repressive use of 
these new powers by the Kibaki government has created significant resistance and the main 
external actors have taken the local opposition into account and have adapted their anti-terror 
agendas by complementing hard security assistance with soft interventions aiming at addressing 
local issues such as conflict prevention and development in communities perceived as being ‘at 
risk’ of harbouring terrorists. Representing a more general shift in security interventions in Africa, 
countering terrorism is now presented as part of a broader ‘peace and security’ agenda, but despite 
using new methods to engage with so-called crucial parts of the population, this is not a paradigm 
shift. Despite the different approaches and objectives, the various projects have ambiguous effects 
and donors have not abandoned the traditional rationality which privileges homeland protection 








IN WESTERN FOREIGN-POLICY DISCOURSE, ‘DEFICIENT’ STATES HAVE SINCE THE 1990S come 
to be seen as a major problem.1 This view was reinforced by the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 which made counterterrorism an important area of transnational policing in 
the sense that risks to national security are addressed abroad.2 Traditional policy approaches 
towards developing countries have thus been modified to combine diplomacy, defence and 
development in addressing weak state capacities and instability in otherwise marginalized 
regions.3 
The academic debate is only slowly coming to terms with this new concurrence of 
development and security strategies beyond the more prominent battlefields of the so-called 
war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq4, and not much is known about how this trend in anti-
terror policies affects African societies.5 Focusing on Kenya and the three main supporters of 
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1. The term deficient states is used synonymously with fragile states and subsumes the labels weak, failing, 
and failed states as well as ‘states at risk’ used for representing African states since the 1990s. See Pinar Bilgin 
and Adam David Morton, ‘Historicising representations of “failed states”: Beyond the cold-war annexation of 
the social sciences’, Third World Quarterly, 23, 1 (2004), pp. 55-80. 
2. Didier Bigo, ‘Globalized (in)security: The field and the ban-opticon’, in Didier Bigo and Anastassia 
Tsoukala (eds), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty. Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11 (Routledge, 
London, 2008), pp 10-48. See also Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2006), pp. 189-217. 
3. Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the world of peoples (Polity, 
Cambridge, 2007). 
4. See for instance Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen and Finn Stepputat (eds), The Security-Development Nexus. 
Expressions of sovereignty and securitization in Southern Africa (HSRC Press, Cape Town, 2007); Robert 
Picciotto and Rachel Weaving (eds), Security and Development. Investing in peace and prosperity (Routledge, 
London, 2007); Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing ‘whole of 
government’ approaches towards fragile states (International Peace Academy, New York, 2007).  
5. For exceptions see Julia M. Eckert (ed.), The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws. The war on terror and the 
classifications of the ‘dangerous other’ (Transcript, Bielefeld, 2008); Jeremy Keenan, ‘Waging war on terror: 
The implications of the new US imperialism for Saharan peoples’, Journal of North African Studies, 10, 3/4 
(2005), pp 619-647. The scope of the problem has led the major international human rights organisations to set 
up special sections on the implications of counterterrorism activities on human rights: 
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the country’s counterterrorism strategy -the US, the UK and Denmark- this article first 
contextualizes the recent counterterrorism engagement within the history of liberal 
development and security interventions in Africa, and then scrutinizes the evolution of 
counterterrorism programmes and their effects on the Kenyan state and society. While the 
projects of the US, the UK and Denmark differ both in motivation and practice, they all 
emphasize the importance of a broader ‘peace and security’ agenda. By complementing a 
genealogy of Western security discourse and practices towards Africa with grounded research 
on reactions and strategies of appropriation of current security-related policies in Kenya, the 
article highlights the positive synergies which can be generated by integrating an international 
relations perspective into area studies and allows for investigation of an oft-neglected but 
important nexus: How do Western interventions affect local societies and how are these 
interventions shaped and appropriated by local politics?6 Through this approach the unclear 
effects of such projects can be comprehended in more detail and also put into global 
perspective. It shows how specific struggles within the donor-recipient relationship and  
micro-struggles can challenge and shape externally defined programmes, while a discourse-
theoretical perspective accounts for shifts in how problems of international security are 
approached on a more structural level and how this, in turn, structures local politics.  
The Kenyan case shows how relatively limited amounts of foreign assistance (as compared 
to what is spent in Afghanistan and Iraq) have significant political effects on the fabric of 
society. On the one hand, strategies concentrating on hard security assistance have enabled the 
government to expand its counterterrorism infrastructure, which in turn has been used for 
controversial security practices against sections of the population suspected to be prone to 
terrorist activities, namely the Muslim minority. On the other hand, these practices have 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.hrw.org/en/category/topic/counterterrorism, http://www.amnesty.org/en/counter-terror-with-justice   
(2 January 2009).  
6. The field research includes 40 semi-structured interviews with representatives of foreign countries 
(diplomats, development officials, members of the military), of Kenyan human rights organisations and Muslim 
organisations as well as politicians and lawyers and was conducted between October and December 2007 and 
August and September 2008 in Nairobi and Mombasa. 
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mobilized opposition within Kenyan society and have also contributed to a rethinking of 
donor agendas where soft security and an engagement with civil society organizations are 
now accentuated. Even though stabilising states in the south to protect liberal order in the 
west resembles the rationality of cold war strategies, we argue that a significant change in the 
means of achieving this end has taken place. During the cold war, regime stability in the south 
was the exclusive goal and state institutions were the direct target of the superpowers. Today 
relevant communities are increasingly approached directly, as has become evident in new 
local participatory projects under the recent peace and security slogan. As part of this strategy, 
even foreign military actors engage in development work with local communities, making the 
boundaries between development and security assistance harder to identify. Despite such 
differences in approach and objective, however, we argue that the projects have yet to 
abandon the traditional rationality according to which Western development and security 
interventions in ‘deficient’ states serve homeland protection and thus continue to prioritize 
stability over civil rights. 
 
  
Liberal interventionism in deficient states 
 
While in the middle of the 1990s deficient statehood was discussed as a root cause of 
internal conflict and a concern for international conflict prevention efforts, since 2001 it is 
increasingly considered to provide a breeding ground for terrorism.7 New cartographies of the 
periphery have emerged which represent deficient states as dangerous, not only to their 
citizens, but most of all, to Western states. As states that cannot control their territory are 
perceived as a security risk, Western governments have developed strategies that combine 
military interventions, building the capacities of recipient states’ security forces, and 
 
7. The following title is indicative: Tatah Mentan, Dilemmas of Weak States: Africa and transnational 
terrorism in the twenty-first century (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004). 
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development programmes.8 While such integrated approaches had initially been promoted as 
means for a ‘developmentalization of security’ in the conflict prevention and peace building 
agenda of the 1990s, the perception of state fragility as a risk for security at home has turned 
this integration into the ‘securitization of development’.9 
The recent securitization of foreign policy has led to an approach to the ‘third world’ that 
resembles that of the cold war: welfare agendas towards the south are subordinated to security 
considerations, and key allies have once more become the main beneficiaries of Western aid.10 
However, these interventions have a new quality as hard security and general development 
interventions are supplemented by new security technologies of governing through 
empowerment, participation, and a new care for those parts of the population who are 
perceived by many donors to be susceptible to harbouring or recruiting terrorists. This trend is 
not only visible in “winning hearts and minds” campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but seems 
to be operating in many deficient and strategically important states. Kenya is a case in point 
here, as the country is perceived to be critical for stability in the Horn and the East-African 
region.   
During the cold war, the policies of the superpowers towards Kenya and the developing 
world more generally were guided by classical geopolitical concerns and put emphasis on 
stabilizing client states.11 With the end of the cold war, however, many former clients lost 
their strategic status, and aid to African states was tied to economic and political 
 
8. See Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars. The merging of development and security (Zed 
Books, London, 2001); Jana Hönke, ‘Fragile Staatlichkeit und der Wandel der Afrikapolitik nach 1990’ 
(Working Paper N° 70, Institute for African Studies, University of Leipzig, 2005). 
9. For a concise discussion of securitization and developmentalization see Florian Kühn, ‘Equal opportunities: 
Exploring the turning point between securitization and developmentalization’ (paper presented at the 49th 
International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, 26 March 2008). 
10. See for a debate on the continuities to the cold war the special issue of Third World Quarterly on nation- 
and state-building 27, 1 (2006) and Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfellow and James Putzel, ‘Policy arena: On the 
discourse of terrorism, security and development’ Journal of International Development 18 (2006), pp. 51-67.  
11. Christopher Clapham, Africa in the International System (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). 
In US foreign policy, for example, the Horn of Africa used to be one of the regions traditionally perceived as a 
‘key to regional stability’. While the main recipient of US military assistance, Ethiopia, turned into an ‘enemy’ 
after the Derg revolution in 1974, its neighbour Kenya proved to be a loyal partner and thus benefited immensely 
from US aid and military training. See Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn. U.S. security policy in Ethiopia 
and Somalia 1953-1991 (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1991), pp. 95-131. 
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conditionalities. But while structural adjustment programmes aimed at downsizing the state 
and at strengthening market forces, academic narratives increasingly discussed institutional 
corruption, neopatrimonialism, and state decay.12 The pendulum swung back in the middle of 
the 1990s when market reform was complemented with state capacity-building to counter 
instability and thus the crisis of governance to which the downsizing of states had contributed. 
Yet the economic and political conditionality of aid and a concern with aid effectiveness 
continued the practice of selectively cooperating with ‘good performers’, but excluding 
‘poorly performing countries’.13  
It was complex emergencies in some of these countries in the 1990s that made them an 
important security concern for Western states. Development and security policies merged into 
an agenda of conflict prevention and peacekeeping where stable states such as Kenya received 
new strategic importance as regional anchor states. Donors began supporting and promoting 
the building of national and regional peacekeeping forces, arguing that this would empower 
African states.14 Yet it was also an effort to ‘disaggregate’15 global peace and conflict 
management and shift the burden of implementation to the south. A problematic blurring of 
the lines between developmental and classical security instruments in the practice of reactive 
conflict management interventions soon became evident.16  This process intensified with 
regard to the functionality of development projects in the fight against terrorism.  
 
12. See for instance William I. Zartman, Collapsed States: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate 
authority (Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1995). For an overview and a critical discussion of these developments 
see Ulf Engel, ‘The African state - probing the failure of a social construction’ (paper prepared for the workshop 
'Africa's Big Dysfunctional States', 21-23 November, Cadenabbia, 2002, mimeo). 
13. Merilee S. Grindle, Challenging the State. Crisis and innovation in Latin America and Africa (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996); Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy. Development discourse and 
good governance in Africa (Zed Books, London, 2000); Joanna Macrae et al., ‘Aid to “poorly performing” 
countries: A critical review of debates and issues’ (Oversees Development Institute, London, 2004), p. 10. 
14. European Council, Council Decision 97/690/CFSP concerning the implementation of common position 
97/356/CFSP ‘Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa’, 20 October 1997, G8: ‘Joint Africa/G8 Plan to 
Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations’, Annex to G8: Implementation report by 
African personal representatives to leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan, Evian, 2003. 
15. Hans-Henrik Holm, ‘A disaggregated world order in the making: Policy towards failed states as an 
example’, International Politics, 38, 3 (2001), pp. 357-74, p. 363. 
16. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, ‘Resetting the rules of engagement: Trends and issues in military–
humanitarian relations’ (HPG Report 21, Oversees Development Institute, London, 2006); David Carment and 
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Even though the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have not given rise to an entirely 
new way of thinking, it dramatically reinforced a perception of deficient states and so-called 
ungoverned spaces as harbouring security risks to Western societies. ‘[T]hreatened less by 
conquering states than […] by failing ones’,17 a minimal consensus emerged among Western 
governments that the failure and collapse of states produces ‘obvious threats, such as 
organized crime and terrorism’ and ‘undermines global governance’.18 In a strategic move 
similar to the containment policies of the cold war, the new counterterrorism agenda 
associates policies aiming at tackling instability in the South with homeland protection and 
social cohesion in the North. 
This securitization of African states has changed the resource allocation of many Western 
powers on the ground and has transformed Africa policies, especially towards allies in the 
“war on terror”. As regards hard security assistance, the long-term trend of disengagement of 
Western militaries from Africa since the end of the cold war has been reversed.19 For example, 
the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA), based in Djibouti comprises 
more than 2300 US personnel to fight terrorism and train African militaries in the Horn of 
Africa. In the perceived “ungoverned spaces” of the Sahel region, the US Trans-Sahara 
Counter-Terrorism Partnership seeks to expand the authorities’ powers into regions which 
have a history of autonomy and have barely been controlled by a central state government 
before. Both anti-terrorism programmes have now been integrated into the new US Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) through which the Pentagon streamlines its military activities on the 
continent. In addition, governments of strategic importance, including the Kenyan 
                                                                                                                                                        
Albrecht Schnabel, Conflict Prevention. Path to peace or grand illusion? (United Nations University Press, 
Tokyo/New York, 2003). 
17. US Government, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ (White House, Washington, 
DC, 2002), p. 1. 
18. European Union, ‘A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 
2003, pp. 8f. 
19. Rita Abrahamsen, ‘Blair’s Africa: The politics of securitization and fear’, Alternatives, 30, 1 (2005), pp. 55-
80.  See also Beall at al., ‘Discourse on terrorism, security and development’, pp. 54. 
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government, continue to benefit from bilateral programmes of military support and security 
sector reform.20  
Development assistance has also been reframed over the last decade, and now particularly 
addresses ‘difficult partnership countries’ and ‘low income countries under stress’ (LICUS). 
Countries that had earlier been sidelined in development assistance receive unprecedented 
attention to check ‘the proclivity of LICUS to become failed states and terrorist havens’.21 In 
addition, traditional development aid has been supplemented by soft security policies that 
target particular parts of the population such as the Kenyan Muslim minority. Fighting 
terrorism is presented as a function of peace and security and propagates a new role not only 
for foreign militaries, but also for the local population.22 This integration of development 
assistance into security policies raises a number of serious concerns. In the next section we 
turn to how this new approach has come about and how it plays out on the ground in Kenya.  
 
Kenya: Donor strategies between development and countering terrorism 
 
Although Kenya seems far away from the primary targets of current Western anti-terror 
interventions, it is perceived as a central strategic ally in the US counterterrorism efforts and 
one of several developing countries designated as ‘anchor states’ for regional stability.23 The 
 
20. Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, ‘The Politics of Africom’ (Washington DC, Association of 
Concerned Africa Scholars Washington DC, Bulletin 78, 2008).    
http://concernedafricascholars.org/analysis/acas-bulletin-78-africom-special-issue/ (19 January 2009). 
21. OECD/DAC, ‘Development Cooperation in Difficult Partnership’ (Note by the Secretariat, 
[DCD/DAC(2002)11/REV1], OECD, Paris, 2002), World Bank, ‘World Bank Group Work in Low-Income 
Countries Under Stress: A Taskforce Report’ (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2002). 
22. A prominent example is the remodelling of the US's new foreign assistance framework in which 
counterterrorism and conflict-prevention projects are now part of the US foreign policy objective of 'peace and 
security', US Department of State, ‘Foreign Assistance Framework’ as of January 29 2007,  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115470.pdf, 13 November 2008).  
23. The National Security Strategy of 2002 established Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa as anchor 
states for US security policies in Sub-Sahara Africa. Pakistan, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan are examples for 
other key regional allies in the “war on terror”. See, for instance, Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller, 
Africa-US Relations: Strategic encounters (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2006); Robert M. 
Hathaway, ‘Leverage and largesse: Pakistan's post-9/11 partnership with America’, Contemporary South Asia, 
16, 1 (2007), pp. 11-24; Shahram Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, islamism, 
and Washington's security agenda (Zed Books, London, 2005). 
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country represents several reasons for the West to stay engaged: despite violent excesses in 
the aftermath of the 2007 general elections, Kenya used to be regarded as a more or less stable 
and reliable partner in development cooperation. At the same time, the country is seen as a 
weak state since the government lacks capacity and credibility in crucial areas such as internal 
security. Kenya has also suffered from terrorist violence – the 1980 bombing of the Norfolk 
Hotel, the 1998 attack on the US embassy in Nairobi as well as the attack on the Paradise 
Hotel in Kikambala in November 2002 – and is perceived as a potential safe haven for 
terrorist recruitment. External actors are also concerned with Kenya’s relatively large (and in 
large parts marginalized) Muslim minority. Finally, it is located next to the ‘failed state’ 
Somalia, a fact that underlines Kenya’s crucial strategic importance in the East African sub-
region.24   
Kenya’s anti-terrorism efforts receive external support mainly from the US, the UK, and the 
Danish government. While there are important similarities between the three donors, there are 
also key differences. The British counterterrorism strategy emphasizes civilian programmes 
targeting crucial parts of the population in order to ‘prevent the radicalisation of 
individuals’.25The Danish liberal-conservative government elected in 2001 stresses the need to 
realign Danish development, foreign and security policy objectives. The government not only 
links state fragility to terrorism but shortly after its election made the fight against terrorism 
one pillar of its development agenda.26 Denmark emphasizes its comparative advantage of soft 
interventions and does not provide bilateral military assistance or training to Kenya. By 
contrast, the US mainly relies on military instruments in combating terrorism and stabilizing 
 
24. Raymond Muhula, ‘Kenya and the global war on terrorism’, in John Davis (ed.), Africa and the War on 
Terrorism (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007), pp. 43-60. 
25. Her Majesty's Government, ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy’ (Her 
Majesty’s Government, London, 2006); Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), ‘Global Opportunities Fund, 
Annual Report 2006/2007’ (FCO, London, 2008). 
26. Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RDMFA), ’Principles governing Danish development assistance 
for the fight against the new terrorism’ (RDMFA, Copenhagen, 2004); RDFMA/Danida, ‘A World of 
Difference. The Government’s Vision for New Priorities in Denmark’s Development Policy’ (RDFMA/Danida, 
Copenhagen, 2003), p. 2. 
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states, supplemented by a democratization agenda.27 Compared to the UK and Denmark, US 
programmes are also more clearly driven by homeland security concerns and the development 
agency USAID has relatively little influence on these imperatives.28  
The anti-terrorism agenda is an important part of the Kenya policy of these donors. Each of 
them is involved in one or more of the following strategies: (1) granting hard security 
assistance to state security forces, (2) providing legal advice on anti-terrorism legislation, and 
(3) engaging with crucial parts of the population on soft security issues. The case of Kenya 
shows how combining these strategies inevitably produce incessant contradictions. 
To begin with the hard security assistance, Kenyan state security institutions have continued 
to receive considerable assistance from the US in order to enable them ‘to meet their 
legitimate defence needs’.29 US foreign policy towards ‘anchor states’ such Kenya has 
primarily concentrated on transforming national security institutions including the military, 
the police, intelligence services, and border patrols into more robust units. The US military 
runs a ‘Contingency Operating Location’ on the island of Lamu from which special 
counterterrorism operations into Somalia were launched during the crackdown on the Islamic 
Courts Union at the end of 2006.30 With funding provided by the $100 million US East 
African Counter-Terrorism Initiatives and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programme, in 2003 
and 2004 the Kenyan government established the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the National 
 
27. Macharia Munene, ‘Human rights and democracy in contemporary global security promotion as a goal of 
US foreign policy: African responses’, in Makumi Mwagiru and Okello Oculli (eds) Rethinking Global Security: 
An African perspective (Heinrich Böll Foundation, Nairobi, 2006) pp. 40-60. See also fn 22. 
28. See for instance Patrick and Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts?, 31-55. 
29. US Department of State, ‘Kenya: Security Assistance’ (US Dep. of State, Washington, DC, 2007). In 2007 
the US delivered weapons worth $2.5 million within the Foreign Military Sales Programme to Kenya. 
Additionally, Kenya is expected to receive $3.1 million for acquiring weaponry from U.S. suppliers within the 
commercial ‘Direct Commercial Sales’ Programme. See Daniel Volman, ‘U.S. military activities in Kenya’ 
(Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, Washington, DC, 2008).  
30. See ‘The Americans have landed’, Business Daily (Nairobi) 20 July 2007, pp. 16-17; ‘African Command: 
American military’s new frontier’, Business Daily (Nairobi) 23 July 2007 pp. 16-18; ‘U.S. airstrike aims at 
Qaeda cell in Somalia’, New York Times, 9 January 2007, p. A3; ‘U.S. used base in Ethiopia to hunt al Qaeda’, 
New York Times, 23 February 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/world/africa/23somalia.html (17 
January 2009). 
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Counter-Terrorism Centre.31 The UK’s assistance to enhance Kenya’s control capacity at the 
Somali border also fits into the strategy of hard security: through the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office’s Global Opportunities Fund, the Administration Police have received 
communication hardware and operations training in order to ‘limit infiltration’ of militants.32 
Additionally, the British military has been involved in training special counterterrorism forces 
in Kenya, but this training had to be stopped in 2008 due to claims that the Kenyan unit took 
part in human rights violations against locals in the Mt Elgon conflict. The training was part 
of the larger ‘Operation Monogram’ in which the UK trains forces of countries in which 
terrorist activities are suspected including Yemen, Morocco and Ethiopia.33 
As a second strategy donors provide legal advice and training in matters of counter-
terrorism to the judiciary, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services. This includes, 
inter alia, advising the government on anti-terrorism legislation, conducting workshops on 
disaster prevention, and awareness-raising about terrorism. The UN Counter-Terrorism 
Committee provides funds and expertise to assist states in complying with UN Security 
Council resolution 1373 (2001) which obliges all member states to criminalize terrorist acts.34 
This strategy is applied by the joint UNDP/UNODC-facilitated project ‘Strengthening 
Counter-Terrorism Capacity for a Safer Kenya’ and is funded by the Danish government.35 
The core objective of the project was the passing of an anti-terrorism bill.  
The third strategy concentrates on soft security and assumes a close relationship between 
poverty and terrorism. As part of this, donors now increasingly link development aid with 
 
31. Volman, ‘U.S. military activities in Kenya’; see also Beth Elise Whitaker, ‘Reluctant partners: Fighting 
terrorism and promoting democracy in Kenya’ International Studies Perspectives 9, 3 (2008) p. 257. 
32. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Global Opportunities Fund. Annual Report 2006-2007’ (FCO, 
London, 2008), p 26. 
33. ‘Trained in terror’, The Guardian (London), 30 July 2008. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/30/kenya.terrorism (18 January 2009); ‘Britain to stop 
training Kenyan soldiers after insurgency crushed’, Channel 4 News (London), 28 July 2008. 
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/britain+to+stop+training+kenyan+soldiers
+after+insurgency+crushed/2363667; (18 January 2009).       
34. Background statement of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/ (2 January 
2009). 
35. UNDP/UNODC, ‘Strengthening counterterrorism capacities for a safer Kenya’ (draft project outline, no 
date). Document on file with the authors. This is a $1 million project implemented by the National 
Counterterrorism Centre and funded by the Danish Foreign Ministry running 2006-2009. 
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security programmes, working with non-state actors and targeting populations who are at risk 
of radicalisation. In a telling formulation of this, a report for the Danish Foreign Ministry 
recommended that poverty reduction should address the ‘constituencies of terrorism, with an 
emphasis on the deprived Islamic people and losers in the globalization process’.36 With the 
announcement of spending DKK 145 million (approx. $24 million) of Danish development 
assistance for fighting terrorism, in 2004 this proposition was solidified into official Danish 
policy. Denmark has also announced two initiatives to counter-act ‘religious radicalism’ in 
Africa – one of them in Kenya with a budget of DKK 15 million (approx. $2.4 million) for a 
three year period.37 The UK also pursues the approach of addressing Muslim groups, and 
drawing on the Global Opportunities Fund’s ‘Engaging with the Islamic World’ programme, 
until recently it supported community policing and a prisons reform programme in the Coast 
Province.38 Similarly, the US has complemented its hard security assistance with a campaign 
in which the military carries out infrastructure projects in the Somali-Kenyan border region in 
order to win the trust of the local Muslim communities; since 2002 the anti-terrorism outlet 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) has sent civil affairs teams to 
various communities to construct schools, dig wells and vaccinate cattle.39 
It is clear from this overview that even though Kenya’s three main donors in the field of 
counterterrorism have launched different strategies in reaction to the new parameters of 
international security after September 11, over time all have emphasized the relevance of 
social development programmes. In this way, traditional development arguments have played 
 
36. Nordic Institute for Asian Studies/RDMFA, ‘Development cooperation as an instrument in the prevention of 
terrorism’ (Nordic Institute for Asian Studies/RDMFA, Copenhagen, 2003), p xi. 
37. RDMFA/Danida, ‘Principles Governing Danish Development Assistance’. Amounts in US-Dollar are based 
on the exchange rate of February 2004 when the programme was announced. 
38. Interview, British High Commission, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 September 2008. Recently, the British Foreign 
merged the formerly separate programmes ‘engaging with the Islamic world’ and ‘counterterrorism’ into the 
‘counter-radicalization and counterterrorism programme`, sending a clear message on the terms of engagement 
to the ‘Islamic world’. It has also renamed the whole scheme: from ‘global opportunities’, an empowering 
message to the rest of the world, to ‘Strategic Programmes Fund’, where British interests are emphasized. 
39. See Sarah Lischer, ‘Winning hearts and minds in the heart of Africa’, Harvard International Review (March 
2007), http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1481/ (31 December 2008) and Reuben E. Brigety II, ‘Humanity as a 
weapon of war. Sustainable security and the role of the US military’ (Centre for American Progress, 
Washington, DC, June 2008). 
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a role in countering terrorism, including assistance for Kenya’s security sector, cooperation 
with the judiciary as well as projects targeting civil society organisations. 
 
 
Using the anti-terrorism infrastructure: recent state security practices in Kenya 
 
External policy blueprints and anti-terror programmes were met by different interests and 
resentments at the local level, by the Kenyan government and civil society and also by local 
staff in the embassies in Nairobi. Beth Whitaker calls the Kenyan government’s relationship 
with the US on counterterrorism a ‘reluctant partnership’ in which the Kenyan government 
often criticizes US foreign policy publicly but cooperates behind the scene.40 In the following 
section we discuss the various practices this ‘partnership’ has allowed for, and show their 
effects on the Kenyan society as well as reactions by local agents in civil societies and donor 
embassies. 
One of the most controversial issues has been the effort to introduce an anti-terrorism bill 
which proved to be more than a mere legal affair.41 In fact, the debate on the Suppression of 
Terrorism Bill became a critical event for Kenya’s state-society relations and has influenced 
the donors’ approach in the country. Shortly after its historic victory in the 2002 elections the 
Kibaki administration presented the Suppression of Terrorism Bill to the Kenyan Parliament 
without any public consultation.42 Human rights organizations argued that several provisions 
in the bill would violate basic civil rights as guaranteed in the Kenyan Constitution. The main 
points of criticism were the broad definition of the term terrorism; the extensive powers given 
to the police to stop, search and detain people; incommunicado detention and immunity of 
 
40. See Whitaker, ‘Reluctant partnership’, pp. 254-271. 
41. For updates see the quarterly bulletins on ‘counterterrorism and human rights’ by the International 
Commission of Jurists, http://www.icj.org/article.php3?id_article=3513&id_rubrique=37 (19 January 2009).  
42. Interview, Paul Muite, former MP and between 2002 and 2007 chair of the committee of the administration 
of justice and legal affairs, Nairobi, Kenya, 11 September 2008; Kenya Gazette Supplement 38, ‘The 
Suppression of Terrorism Bill’ (Government Printers, Nairobi, 30 April 2003). 
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state officials from prosecution. Additionally, the extensive power of the Minister for Internal 
Security to declare by decree an organization terrorist and the fact that being associated with a 
declared terrorist organization constitutes a crime have been questioned.43 However, the 
clause that raised the most anger was the provision that a person may be arrested without a 
warrant ‘who, in a public place wears an item of clothing […] in such a way or in such 
circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a declared 
terrorist organisation’.44 The Muslim community feared that members might be arrested on the 
mere basis of their appearance as Muslim. After fierce opposition from parts of the public and 
key members of the parliament, the bill was withdrawn. A second draft, introduced in 2006, 
was also withdrawn despite pressure from abroad and internal interests to implement it.45 In 
the end the government recognized that it could not get a majority vote.  
However, some of its discriminatory provisions were nevertheless carried out in practice by 
the state security forces, even though the law had not been enacted.46 Substantial criticism has 
been levelled at the Kenyan authorities, especially the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) 
due to its random actions and its lack of accountability.47 In the words of one human rights 
activist: 
The rationale of setting up and disbanding special units in this country seems to be about personal 
gains. They ask: What’s in for us? As for the ATPU you can bribe your way out. The ‘war on 
terrorism’ provided a lot of goodies for the Kenyan security sector from outside: hardware, 
training, assistance. The police became quite enthusiastic about those things. To a certain extent 
ATPU is an amorphous institution, filled with secrecy and corruption.48 
 
 
43. Amnesty International, ‘Memorandum to the Kenyan government on the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 
2003’ (Amnesty International, London, 2004); International Commission of Jurists-Kenya Section (ICJ), ‘ICJ 
Eminent Jurist Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights. East African Regional Hearings’ 
(ICJ, Geneva, 2006).  
44.  Kenya Gazette, ‘The Suppression of Terrorism Bill’. 
45. Interview, Muite, Nairobi, 11 September 2008. 
46. Interview, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Nairobi, 21 November 2007.  
47. Amnesty International, ‘Kenya: The impact of 'anti-terrorism' operations’ (Amnesty International, London, 
2005). 
48. Interview, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Nairobi, 21 November 2007. 
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Recent anti-terrorism practices have led to increasingly tense relations between the central 
government and the Muslim community.49 Since the Kikambala bombings, arrests and raids 
have caused a climate of fear amongst Muslim communities, particularly amongst Somali 
communities and Muslims in the Coast Province as hundreds of people were illegally 
detained.50  
Another event that damaged the relations between the Kenyan Muslims and the government 
substantially was the invasion by Ethiopian forces into Somalia in December 2006, with the 
active backing of US forces operating from bases in Ethiopia and Kenya. The US sent a 
special operations unit to Ethiopia and Kenya in the hope of tracking al-Qaeda militants 
amongst the refugees.51 Kenyan security forces then arrested at least 150 people from 18 
different countries who were trying to enter Kenyan territory and transferred them to Nairobi, 
before flying at least 90 of them to Somalia and Ethiopia.52 The government of Kenya did 
everything possible to downplay the problem by denying that there were Kenyans amongst 
the deported, significantly exacerbating tensions with the Muslim population. It provoked the 
influential Muslim umbrella group National Muslim Leaders Forum at the height of the 2007 
general elections campaign to publicly state their distrust in the Kibaki administration and to 
rally around opposition leader Raila Odinga. Odinga seized the opportunity and made public 
the names of 19 Kenyan Muslims amongst the deported.53 
 
49. Arye Oded, Islam and Politics in Kenya (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2000); see for more recent accounts 
Rüdiger Seesemann, ‘East African muslims after 9/11’ (Bayreuth African Studies Working Paper 3, Institut für 
Afrikastudien, 2005). 
50. Amnesty International, ‘Kenya: The impact of 'anti-terrorism' operations on human rights’; International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel on Terrorism’. 
51. ‘U.S. used base in Ethiopia to hunt Al Qaeda’, New York Times, 23 February 2007. , 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/world/africa/23somalia.html (17 January 2009). 
52. Muslim Human Rights Forum, ‘Horn of Terror’ (Revised Edition, Nairobi, September 2008), Amnesty 
International, ‘Horn of Africa: Unlawful transfers in the “war on terror”’ (Amnesty International, London, 2007). 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Why am I still here? The 2007 Horn of Africa renditions and the fate of those still 
missing’ (Human Rights Watch, New York, October 2008), ‘Michuki cleared on deportation’, Daily Nation 
(Nairobi) 22 November 2007, p.16. At the beginning of October 2008 Ethiopia released eight Kenyan citizens. 
See ‘Ethiopia frees Kenyan “Islamists”’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7652593.stm, (4 October 
2008). 
53. ‘Kenya Faces International Outcry over mass transfer of ‘terrorists’ to Ethiopia’, Sunday Nation (Nairobi), 
15 April 2007, pp.4-5; ‘Muslim Lobbies Take Issue with Michuki’s Deportation Denial’, The Standard 
(Nairobi), 24 October 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200710231214.htm  (16 November 2007); 
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It is well known that in many African countries security institutions are more often than 
elsewhere an instrument for strengthening personal rule and are characterized by a culture of 
secrecy and impunity. Current donor policies may strengthen this propensity.54  At the very 
least, the practices by Kenyan security institutions raise serious doubts about the priority 
given by international donors to strengthening state security sectors without a simultaneously 
strong focus on accountability and transparency.  
 
Engaging communities in the “war on terror” 
 
Although practices in the name of counterterrorism have deeply affected the relations 
between Muslims and the government, it also created a stronger cooperation between Muslim 
groups and the broader society. This political context has in turn been influential in widening 
the donors’ counterterrorism agenda, integrating crime and insecurity and supporting the 
projects of local non-state organisations and Muslim communities.  
One illustration of the minority’s increasing national weight was the fight for the “Muslim 
vote” prior to the general elections in 2007, when a Memorandum of Understanding between 
Raila Odinga and the National Muslim Leaders Forum (Namlef) was signed. In the MoU, 
Muslim grievances against their treatment by the Kibaki administration were the key theme. 
Odinga, in turn, not only promised to fight for a fair representation of Muslims within Kenyan 
society but also promised an investigation against arbitrary anti-terrorism measures.55    
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Raila releases a list of deported Muslims’, Daily Nation (Nairobi) 19 October 2007, 
 http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=1&newsid=108779 (16 November 
2007). 
54. Alice Hills, Policing Africa. Internal security and the limits of liberalization, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 
2000), Jana Hönke, ‘Security Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 
(2/ 2009), pp. 15-21. In a critical account of the achievements of security sector reform Marina Caparini warns 
that too often ‘human rights concerns are subordinate to the requirements of improving military or internal 
security capacities’. Marina Caparini, ‘A response to Herbert Wulf’s paper’ (Berghof Handbook For Conflict 
Transformation, Dialogue 2, 2004, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management) 
www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2_caparini.pdf (19 January 2009).   
55. See ‘Revealed: Raila’s real MoU with Muslims’, Daily Nation (Nairobi), 28 November 2007, p. 1. 
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At the same time, the broad opposition against the Suppression of Terrorism Bill has 
resulted in a better coordination between Muslim organizations and the (mainly non-Muslim) 
mainstream human rights community and in an increased professionalism to mobilize and to 
lobby for their rights.56 Both Muslim and non-Muslim human rights groups are sceptical about 
ongoing security and counter-terrorist practices that are usually perceived as an externally 
driven agenda. Violations of hard-fought-for civil rights by the police and the illegal 
extradition of Kenyans are seen as symptoms of a wider malaise: that of secrecy and 
unaccountability of large parts of the state administration.57  
The new assertiveness, especially of Muslim human rights groups, is also reflected in the 
various encounters between Muslim groups and donors. All the major external actors involved 
in counterterrorism activities in Kenya have become keen to emphasize a developmental 
approach – offering legal assistance, raising awareness on counterterrorism and human rights, 
applying a broader notion of security, and, most of all, engaging with Muslim communities or 
local organizations in the country’s predominantly Muslim provinces – even if for some 
donors this is only complementary to the traditional way of training state security institutions.  
In this way, the counterterrorism of the years immediately after September 11 has been 
reframed into a ‘peace and security’ agenda that also includes a development element. 
However, while welcoming the donors’ reorientation on how to counter terrorism, some 
groups remain cautious as to the donors’ objectives.58 
In order to get a clearer picture of how the current security regime materializes and is being 
challenged or reinforced on the ground, it is crucial to look at agency both within foreign 
embassies and at the level of the organizations and communities amongst the recipients. The 
 
56. This has been confirmed by several representatives from both sides. Interviews, representatives of different 
human rights organizations, Nairobi, 1 November 2007, 14 November 2007, 11 December 2007; representative 
Muslim umbrella organization, Nairobi, 7 December 2007; representative Muslim umbrella organization, 
Mombasa, 28 November 2007. 
57. Ibd. 
58. Interviews, representative human rights organization, Mombasa, 8 September 2008; representative Muslim 
organization, Mombasa, 9 September 2008.  
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protest against security practices in Kenya has had an impact on the re-modelling of some of 
the counterterrorism projects in this field, although clear results of those projects have yet to 
materialize.  
The Danish bilateral project on counter-terrorism activities in Kenya was initiated by 
Copenhagen as part of the ambition to align development assistance and the fight against 
terrorism. At the same time, however, the Danish embassy in Nairobi was able to actively 
participate in designing the bilateral project on the ground. While trying to identify possible 
non-state partners, the fact finding mission was not only confronted with the question of 
whether the project should work exclusively with Muslim groups, but also by opposition from 
Muslim organizations who were reluctant to cooperate with Western donors under the label of 
counterterrorism.59 Following these conflicts, the project was renamed ‘peace, security and 
development’ and now operates as a budget support to five local organizations (including 
Muslim, inter-faith and non-religious groups) working on a wide variety of issues including 
conflict prevention, inter-religious mediations, human rights trainings, local peace meetings, 
and youth empowerment.60 The local partner institutions themselves praise the autonomy the 
Danish embassy allows them in pursuing their own activities rather than following pre-
designed counterterrorism projects. The reformulation is celebrated as a victory by the partner 
organizations – interpreted as a proof that local NGOs have the space to determine the donors’ 
objectives and strategies. At the same time, increasing donor interest in this field allows local 
groups to jump on the “peace and security” bandwagon and collect the resources provided, 
which may have divisive effects as it affects intra-communal power relations.61 
Despite the move towards engaging with local populations, addressing small-scale 
development, everyday crime and conflict resolution rather than focussing narrowly on 
 
59.  Interviews, Danish embassy, Nairobi 12 November 2007, 27 August 2008, 17 September 2008. Interviews, 
partner organizations of the Danish programme, Mombasa 26 November 2007, 9 September 2008.  
60. Interview, Danish embassy, Nairobi, 17 September 2008; Repeated interviews with representatives of three 
of these organizations, Mombasa, 26-28 November 2007 and 8-9 September 2008; Nairobi, 12 September 2008. 
61. These concerns were expressed by two senior representatives of Muslim organizations: Interviews, Nairobi, 
7 December 2007; Mombasa, 9 September 2008. 
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terrorism, donors acknowledge their uncertainty about the impacts and long-term effects of 
their projects and draw different conclusions. The UK, for example, has not continued the 
cooperation on community policing and prisons reform with a Muslim group at the coast, as 
there were persisting doubts about impact and sustainability.62 Given the institutional 
weakness but strategic importance of most local partners of the Danish ‘peace, security and 
development’ project, the Danish embassy had to concentrate first on institutional support for 
the partners. While their activities are related to the very broad objective of contributing ‘to 
the promotion of a democratic Kenyan society, open to all ethnic and religious groups, as an 
attractive alternative to political violence’, doubts remain about the project’s success.63  
The US efforts to work with Muslim communities in Kenya are seen with great suspicion by 
the interviewed Muslim groups. CJTF-HoA’s small-scale development activities have evoked 
widespread criticism as until recently they did not consult with Kenyan stakeholders or other 
US government agencies. As one USAID official argued: 
 
It was a disaster […] the local population does not want to engage with the military, not with the 
Kenyan, leave alone with the US. Their perception is that the whole sector of foreign assistance 
has become a grey area, that aid becomes militarized, and that we are doing [are] ‘winning hearts 
and minds campaigns’ rather than development work.64 
 
The US government officially justifies the increased engagement of the army in local social 
development with the better resources and in-house capacity for infrastructure projects of the 
Pentagon.65 Yet, a study by the military academy at West Point emphasises three strategic 
benefits in shifting the assistance from military operations to economic development in 
Kenya’s Coastal area:  
 
62. Interview, British High Commission, Nairobi, 2 September 2008. 
63. Interview, Danish embassy, Nairobi, 27 August 2008 and 17 September 2008.  
64. Interview, US embassy, Nairobi, 26 August 2008. 
65. Interview, US embassy, Nairobi, 13 December 2007.  
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First, it will increase intelligence on terrorist activities. Second, it will decrease the political 
costs Kenyan politicians pay for supporting U.S. counterterrorism priorities, and so increase their 
level of cooperation. Third, increased economic aid raises the cost to terrorists of providing social 
services as a buy-in mechanism for their larger goals.66  
Despite their differences in approach and activities the projects discussed above are the 
result of the Western concerns for homeland security. From a socio-economic perspective, a 
concern for local economic development and crime prevention in Kenya’s coast province may 
be fully justifiable, but the more they are linked with the military and intelligence, the more 
likely they are to be met with resistance from local groups and this is why these initiatives 
often have ambiguous effects. In the case of more civilian projects such as the Danish and the 
British schemes, long-term local development objectives have to be weighed against rather 
short-term security objectives. In turn, in cases where such programmes are appropriated by 
local actors for their own interests, the projects’ potential side effects such as shifting local 




Our analysis of recent liberal interventionism and of counterterrorism in Kenya shows how 
addressing risks to "homeland security" perceived to emanate from deficient states in Africa 
has further merged Western security and development policies. It demonstrates that current 
external state-building and the empowerment of state security institutions are appropriated for 
illiberal purposes. Demonstrating their adaptability to national and international dynamics 
such as strong local criticism of the state-centred counterterrorism policies, strengthening the 
 
66. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, ‘Al-Qaeda's (Mis-)Adventures in the Horn of Africa’, p 70. 
67. See the critical literature on the effects of development aid: James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. 
Development, depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 
1994), Graham Harrison, The World Bank and Africa. The construction of governance states (Routledge, 
London, 2004), David Mosse & David Lewis, The Aid Effect. Giving and governing in international 
development (Pluto, London, 2005). 
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security capacities of the Kenyan state through counterterrorism assistance has thus been 
complemented with an engagement with local groups in Muslim-dominated regions under the 
new label of peace and security. This label now spans projects involving counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency, conflict prevention, and local welfare projects. As the history of merging 
development and security interventions points to the ambiguous motivations and effects of 
such policies, a closer scrutiny of the manifestations of the donors’ new agenda is needed.  
Contrary to perceptions of a monolithic securitized discourse, in Kenya local agents have 
had the ability to modify pre-designed agendas for these new developmental security projects. 
Many Muslim communities in the Coast region in Kenya, for instance, embrace the focus on 
everyday crime and socio-economic issues. However, our analysis has shown that if such an 
approach remains exclusively guided by the logic of combating risks to (Western) security 
abroad, it may produce unintended consequences. 
Some external players are clear that intelligence-gathering and preventing terrorists from 
‘capturing’ local populations are major motivations behind their new agenda of working with 
Muslim communities. The popular Field Manual ‘Counterinsurgency’ by the US Army, for 
instance, argues in favour of integrating ‘host nation partners’, particularly NGOs, on every 
planning level. It also demands the implementation of economic programmes (such as 
infrastructure) and stresses the need for personnel with ‘region-specific knowledge’.68  
To shed light on the local dynamics of such global strategies, we argue for an approach that 
combines a discourse analysis of programmes and rationalities at the international level with 
field research on the social effects, the appropriation and contestation of such programmes at 
the local level. An analysis of micro-dynamics of power within developmental 
counterterrorism projects in Kenya has brought to the fore the possibilities for both embassy 
officials and local organizations to influence dominant programmes. In this context, however, 
future research has to engage more deeply with the functionality of development as 
 
68. U.S. Army, ‘Field Manual 3-24. Counterinsurgency’ (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2007), paragraphs 
2-1 and 2-17 to 2-22. 
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counterinsurgency, and with the use of potentially emancipative development projects as new 
modes of governing populations. 
